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【註1·1】A.J.M.米尔恩：《人的权利与人的多样性——人权哲学》，第118页，夏勇、张志铭译，中国大百科全书出版社，北京，1995.
【註1·2】美国政治学家加尔布雷斯（John Kenneth Galbraith）把权力分为Condign power 、Compensatory power、 Conditioned power三种，中文译为应得权力、补偿权力、调控权力。参见加尔布雷斯：《权力的剖析》，刘北成译，时报文化出版，台北，1992年。
【註1·3】权力在动物世界中也存在。黑猩猩社会中存在权力，在白蚁、鼹鼠、蚂蚁、蜜蜂社会，也存在权力。本书主要谈人类社会中的国家权力。美國政治學家拉斯威爾（H. Lasswell）在1950年代提出，權力是研究「誰、贏得何物、何時、如何贏得？」（Who get what，when and how？），这并不是权力的定义。行使权力有一个主体，这个主体要有自己决定、自己行为的能力。在机器人和人工智能时代，权力概念将会有新的扩展。
【註1·4】霍菲尔德把这种情况下的权利，称为特权（privilege）。霍菲尔德指有特权的人可以有这样行为或不行为而不受他人干涉的自由（liberty），特权（即没有义务）仅关系到本人的行为。
【註1·5】霍菲尔德把这种权利称为「狭义的权利」，由于霍菲尔德是从法律关系分析权利问题的，他对「狭义的权利」的定义是，指有权利的人可以迫使他人这样行为或不行为。
【註1·6】约翰·洛克：《政府论》下篇，第89页，商务印书馆，北京，1982年版
【註1·7】孟德斯鸠：《论法的精神》上册，第156页，商务印书馆，北京，1982年版
Foreword
Andrew J. Nathan
（ Professor of Political Science，
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY IN THE CITY OF NEW YORK）
Yan Jiaqi, the founding director of the Institute of Political Science of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, was China’s first professional political scientist in the true sense of that term. That is, he views politics as a subject of open-minded, fact-based inquiry, not as a subject of dogma and propaganda. As post-Mao China’s first practitioner of this kind of political science, he set the model for what political science could be in China. Even though Yan is now forced to live in exile, his model of scholarship remains influential among many practicing political scientists in China – not, to be sure, among the academic authorities set above the scholars by the Party, but among serious teachers and scholars who want to understand how political life really works, whether in China or abroad.
Some of China’s excellent younger political scientists today use quantitative data or game theory to test theories of micro-behavior. Yan’s model of political science reflects an earlier approach that is still essential. He takes the entire history of humanity, in China and in the rest of the world, as his source of data about how human beings behave politically. He defines concepts like “power” and “rights” clearly and carefully. He asks the big questions that have driven political inquiry since Plato and Aristotle, such as the sources of political order and disorder. And he writes in language that ordinary people can understand, to reach all who have a stake in politics. Thanks to the breadth of his scholarship and the clarity of his writing, no one has done more to inform the Chinese people of the wealth of experience that humanity has gained, across the centuries across the globe, with the forms of political organization and the variety of political theories.
Yan has focused more than anything else on the core issue that has faced Chinese thinkers since the beginning of China’s encounter with the West: what is the best political form for China? Should it be a monarchy? A constitutional republic? A one-party dictatorship serving as a transitional stage to democracy (so-called “tutelary authoritarianism”)? Or a one-party authoritarian state that claims to rule as a technocracy? Should China, as a vast, multi-ethnic country, configure itself as an empire, a unitary political system, or a federal system? Should leaders design policies according to an ideological doctrine, or according to some form of technocratic reason, or through practical experimentation to select policies that work best?
Yan’s explorations of history have delivered an emphatic answer: dictatorship is not a good form of government. The over-concentration of power suppresses the creativity of the people, distorts the personality of the ruler, leads to abuse, and destroys the ability of the political system to adjust from failures and adapt to new challenges.
Originally trained as a physicist and mathematician, Yan burst onto the scene as a full-fledged political scientist at the start of the reform era in 1978, with a famous article in Guangming ribao – reproduced as an appendix to this book – on an imaginary visit to three historical courts – those of religion (a 17th century Papal court), rationality (Enlightenment France), and practice (Deng Xiaoping’s China). The article showed through example that political decisions must be guided neither by ideological doctrine nor by abstract theory, but by the scientific attitude of finding out what actually works – a message very welcome to Deng Xiaoping and his reform colleagues at the time. In a later work, an exhaustive history of the Cultural Revolution, co-authored with his wife Gao Gao, Yan showed how Maoist fanaticism damaged the the Chinese state and people. Yet another of Yan’s famous works explained with great learning why China should adapt a federalist form of government in order to provide fair treatment and maintain the loyalty of the national minorities.
In 1980 Yan published an article, also included in the present volume, explaining the differences among dictatorship, constitutionalism, and republicanism. He was a pioneer of the view – which is today the mainstream of Chinese liberal thinking -- that the ruling party should exercise power in keeping with the rules of the national Constitution. Of course, for a constitutional republic to function, the public must be educated, politically aware, and willing to obey the law. These are conditions that the Chinese people fulfill.
But there is another condition: those people must also be committed to respecting the law. This is a difficult condition to fulfill, because law and politics are in some ways opposite systems. Politics is about the struggle for power; law is about setting limits on the struggle for power.
Nonetheless, for some time after the death of Mao Zedong, it seemed that Chinese power-holders – terrified by their own experiences during the Cultural Revolution – would allow the law to limit their power struggles. The political reformers around Deng Xiaoping reintroduced laws, courts, and lawyers; allowed citizens to sue the state; created a civil service system for government employees; and regularized the procedures for promoting cadres within the party.
As Yan pointed out in several of his works, a key requirement for taming the viciousness of politics through law is a system of term limits for the most powerful leaders. Mao – like Hitler, Stalin, and other dictators – had served as the top leader until his death. This was also true of other senior cadres in China and other dictatorial systems: they served until they either died or were purged. Yan explained why lifelong tenure is dangerous for the state in his 1983 book, The Lifelong Tenure System and the Limited Tenure System 终身制和限任制, and in other works. Lifelong tenure tempts leaders to view themselves as indispensable. It leads them to fear what might happen to them after they give up power. It weakens the ability of other political forces to limit the leader’s power. It stifles the careers of talented younger politicians and drives the most talented people out of politics altogether. It makes officials and ordinary people afraid to speak the truth, deprives the top leader of information and ideas, and leads sooner or later to tragic mistakes.
Deng Xiaoping agreed with Yan’s argument. He introduced an age-based retirement system for political leaders and wrote a limit of two terms for the post of President of the PRC into the 1982 PRC constitution. Within the Chinese Communist Party, Deng’s system of fixed retirement ages evolved into an informal limit of two terms for the top position of Party General Secretary. This system did not come into effect all in one effort. It became institutionalized gradually. Thus, Jiang Zemin held office as General Secretary for more than two full terms. When he handed over that top party post to Hu Jintao, he kept the position of chairman of the Central Military Commission for an extra two years. And after his full retirement from formal office, he exercised great influence in the Hu Jintao period through his many subordinates who still held office, the so-called Shanghai Gang. Even so, the system of limited terms seemed to be more and more accepted. Hu Jintao stepped down on schedule in 2012 and Xi Jinping succeeded to all three top position (party, state, and military) on schedule in 2012-2013.
But today the system of term limits has been abandoned. In March, 2018, Xi Jinping ordered the state constitution to be amended to remove the limit of two terms for the state president. This came after his strong consolidation of power within the Chinese Communist Party and the People’s Liberation Army, using the anti-corruption campaign to purge all rivals, replacing top military officers with his own appointees, and placing a dominant number of his loyalists in the Politburo at the 19th Party Congress. The amendment of the state constitution was only the final act in the process of removing all constraints on Xi’s power.
This dangerous trend has motivated Yan Jiaqi to revisit the issue of term limits in his important new book. Searching again through the archives of human history and geography, Yan reveals that our most precious political institutions are never fully secure. Political systems have made progress in constraining power through term limits. But at times of disorder or corruption, leaders have often abolished such limits on the pretext of restoring order. They suppress criticism, jail those who have independent views, and oppress persons of talent.
Instead of creating order, such violations of rule of law generate an even more intense struggle for power. Now there is only one location of real power in the system – only one position where a power-holder can have real influence and enjoy the temporary illusion of safety. The more power is concentrated, the worse is the struggle for power, consisting of passive resistance and subtle undermining while the top leader appears strong, and a vicious succession struggle when he grows weak. In these ways the concentration of power brings the reversal of the rule of law and the weakening, rather than strengthening, of the constitution and of the state. Excessive power accentuates the weaknesses of the power holder’s personality and sooner or later brings disaster to the society.
I admire Yan Jiaqi’s sense of duty to his country in addressing this question at this important time. I admire his faith that his fellow Chinese are public-spirited and interested in the truth, and that they are willing to learn important lessons from serious scholarship. I admire his belief in the ability of authentic political science to enlighten readers and to help citizens set their country on the right course. Indeed, I have admired Yan Jiaqi’s work since he began to write about politics after the Cultural Revolution, and I have had the pleasure of knowing him since he came to the United States in 1990. It is my pleasure to recommend this illuminating and thoughtful book to everyone who takes an interest in the crucial question of how China should be governed.
Andrew J. Nathan New York July 4, 2018 作者: wy10002001 时间: 2020-1-18 06:49
中国的持续发展是海外汉奸及其主子的恐惧。可以肯定的是西方绝不希望中国繁荣昌盛，要让西方满意就是回到百年以前任人宰割的中国。作者: synetsh 时间: 2020-1-18 07:19
很多两会代表及中共干部就是西方国家公民，对于这些汉奸，就算割了习近平脑袋，它也没办法解决这些敌对势力，归根结底是习无能造成的情形
