同时,根据2002年中共十六大的权力更替,黎安友称赞有加,认为十六大增加了权力更替的正常性,在提拔政治领袖时,增加了精英而不是派别的考虑,在政权内增加了体制的多元性和功能的专业性,并为政治参与和民众上访建立了制度,由此加强了中共在公众心目中的合法性。借助这些变化,中共就得以更好地适应和生存(adaption and survive)。15所以,黎安友在2009年承认:“天安门事件过去20年后的今天,中国集权专制适应和恢复的能力仍然使人惊讶”,16并认为,研究中共专制制度的适应和恢复能力,也许能够有助于推动比较专制制度研究的复兴。17
笔者曾在2007年10月发文提出,中共十七大所产生的中共中央政治局常委,已经出现了党内派系的轮廓。26李成在2009年,也提出“政敌团队”(team of rivals)的概念,认为自从十七大后,中共出现了习近平和李克强双接班的格局,说明中共内部已经出现了一党两派的新活力。27王飞凌也提出,承认党内有派,既是中共政治现实的反映,也有助于推动自上而下的精英民主政治。28尽管沈大伟对这种党内派别民主表示怀疑,因为一个列宁主义的政党已经花费了它们全部的制度生命,尝试消灭党内的宗派主义,但他并不排斥一种可能性:即在一党体制下,创造互相竞争的选民(competitive constituencies within a one-party system),与香港和新加坡模式类同。29
1 Andrew Nathan,“Authoritarian Resilience,”Journal of Democracy, 14 (January 2003): 6.
2 Arthur Waldron,“The End of Communism,”Journal of Democracy 9 (January 1998):41-47; Robert Scalapino,“Current Trends and Future Prospects,”Journal of Democracy 9 (January 1998):35-40.
3Roderick MacFarquhar,“The Anatomy of Collapse,”York New Review of Books, September 26, 1991, 5-9.
4“Debate #1: Is Communist Party Rule Sustainable in China? Remarks by Roderick MacFarquhar, Harvard University,”in Reforming China Policy: The Carnegie Debate, Library of Congress, October 5, 2006. (http://www.carnegieendowment.org ... 6&&prog=zch).
5 Susan Shirk, China: Fragile Superpower (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 7.
6Arthur Waldron,“After Deng, the Deluge,”Foreign Affairs (September-October 1995): 148-53; Arthur Waldron,“A Free and Democratic China?”Commentary (November 2000): 27-32; Arthur Waldron,“The Chinese Sickness,”Commentary (July 2003): 36-42; Jeffrey Wasserstrom,“Beijing’s New Legitimacy Crisis,”Far Eastern Economic Review (December 2004): 25-30; Jeffrey Wasserstrom,“Will the Party Never End,”Australian Financial Weekend Review, June 11, 2004; Bruce Gilley,“The Year China Started to Decline,”Far Eastern Economic Review (September 2005): 32-35; Bruce Gilley,“Should We Try to Predict Transitions to Democracy? Lessons from China,”Whitehead Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations (Winter-Spring 2005): 113-28.
7 Gordon G. Chang, The Coming Collapse of China (New York: Random House, 2001), 7.
8 Bruce Gilley, China’s Democratic Future: How It Will Happen and Where It Will Lead (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004); Bruce Gilley,“The Year China Started to Decline,”Far Eastern Economic Review (September 2005): 32-35.
9 Larry Diamond,“Authoritarian Learning: Lessons from the Color Revolutions,”Brown Journal of World Affairs 12 (2) (Winter-Spring 2006): 219.
10 Nathan,“Authoritarian Resilience,”6.
11 Ibid.
12 Talcott Parsons, The Social System (New York: Free Press, 1951), 525–35. Cited from Nathan,“Authoritarian Resilience,”16.
13 Richard Lowenthal,“Development vs. Utopia in Communist Policy,”in Chalmers Johnson, ed., Change in Communist Systems (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1970), 33–116. Cited from Nathan,“Authoritarian Resilience,”16.
14 Nathan,“Authoritarian Resilience,”16.
15 Ibid, 6-7.
16 Nathan,“Authoritarian Impermanence,”Journal of Democracy, 20 (July 2009): 37.
17 Ibid, 38; David Shambaugh, China’s Communist Party: Atrophy and Adaptation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2009).
18 Nathan,“Authoritarian Resilience,”11.
19 Ibid.
20 Bruce Dickson,“The Future of the Chinese Communist Party: Strategies for Survival and Prospects for Change,”in Charting China’s Future: Political, Social and International Dimensions, ed. Jae Ho Chung (Lanham, Md.: Roman & Littlefield, 2006), 91.
21 Shambaugh, China’s Communist Party, 176.
22 Ibid, 36.
23 Comments by Richard Baum at the conference on“The Overseas Study of Contemporary China,”Fudan University, Shanghai, November 6, 2005. Cited from Shambaugh, China’s Communist Party, 39.
24例如,经济因素包括:
1)货币不能自由兑换(nonconvertible currencies);
2)在产权上国家垄断的腐蚀(erosion of state monopoly on property rights);
3)不断增加的国家预算赤字(increasing government budget deficits);
4)自经济改革开始以来的路径依赖(因为地方干部和强势公民的新利益) (path dependence once economic reforms had begun, due to new vested interests of local cadres and empowered citizens);
5)随着政府寻租现象的上升,地方党政部门(包括军队)新资源和新财源的出现(new sources of revenue available to local party and state organs [military too], and the resulting rise of governmental“rent seeking);
6)包括马列主义的去合法性(delegitimization of Marxist-Leninist ideology);
7)官员腐败和政党特权(official corruption and party privileges);
8)新政治精英在党外的基层出现(new political elites emerge at the local level outside of party structure);
9)工作单位基层党组织的丧失和消失(corrosion and disappearance of local party cells in work units);
10)以及提供公共产品的国家能力下降(declining state capacity in provision of public goods)。而在社会因素方面则包括:
1)自治或半自治公民组织和公民社会的兴起(rise of semiautonomous or autonomous civic organizations [civil society]);
2)腐败的发展(rising corruption);
3)劳工流动和可选择的就业机会的增加(increased labor mobility and alternative employment opportunities)。
另外,文化因素方面则涵盖:
1)对政府和意识形态产生道德真空和公共质疑(moral vacuum and public cynicism toward regime and its ideology);
2)全球化影响了流行文化(globalization affects popular culture);
3)民族主义身份的加强(increasing nationalist identity [as distinct from socialist identity]);
4)宗教吸引力增加(increasing appeal of religion)。
还有在压制性因素方面(coercive),则包括:
1)对人权问题的关切增加了敏感性(increased sensitivity to human rights concerns);
2)使用大众恐怖和威胁手段减弱(decline in use of mass terror and intimidation tactics)。
最后,在国际因素方面,主要表现在全球化的出现和增强(globalization)。Shambaugh, China’s Communist Party, 162-164, table 8.1.