惠灵顿公爵（Lord Wellington）曾经这样形容滑铁卢的胜利——"你一生中所能见到的最势均力敌的一次竞赛"。惠灵顿公爵的说明也可以用来形容中日的钓鱼岛(专题|论坛)/尖阁诸岛之战，或者在东北亚的海域其他地方引起的海战。这样的一场战斗在2010年之前似乎还遥不可及，那一年，日本的海巡船逮捕了在有纠纷岛屿附近冲撞舰只的中国渔民。但是，这种战争现在看来更有可能发生了。在八月中旬，日本决定拘捕并遣返中国的保钓活动家后，中方的鹰派将军罗援不断喊话，要求派遣一百艘船捍卫钓鱼台，东海舰队也发动两栖攻击岛屿演习，中国攻打钓鱼台的可能性并非完全不存在。8月20日，带有民族主义色彩的中国媒体《环球时报》在一篇整版社论（点击阅读《做好对日斗争尖锐升级的准备》）中警告说，"日本将为自己的行为付出代价……结果可能比他们期望的要糟糕得多"。
这并非只是做做样子。今年七月，中国东海舰队在东海海域进行了一场实弹演习，模拟了岛屿遭受两栖攻击的情况。中国的领导人很清楚是在考虑极端情况。当反日游行的示威者们在街上上演砸烂日本车，攻击寿司店的时候，他们背后可能是有民意支持。那么如果在太平洋爆发冲突，谁比较可能获胜呢？中国还是日本？
尽官日本最近给人留下的影响是军事弱国，但打起海战来，未必就会输给中国。虽然"二战"之后日本的"和平"宪法称"日本将永远放弃以国权发动的战争、武力威胁或武力行使作为解决国际争端的手段"，但自二战后，日本的海上自卫队已经积累了许多卓越的经验和成果，例如水下作战。日本的水手因其职业化而闻名。如果指挥官们能巧妙地利用好人力、装备和地理优势的话，东京有可能在和中国的海战中不分伯仲——甚至还可能获胜。
两大劲敌过去的海战为今天的岛屿纠纷埋下了伏笔。在1894－1895年间的中日之战（译注：即甲午战争）中，由于日本海上舰队的加入，亚洲以中国为中心的地区秩序"在一个下午之间就被颠覆"。由于明治维新的影响，日本帝国的海军战舰由进口船身和组件快速组建起来，轻松地击溃了当时被认为是最先进的中国北洋舰队。1894年九月，日本先进的航海和射击技术，以及高昂的士气，令日本赢得了同中国的黄海海战。虽然现在日本不再是一个崛起的强国，但日本海上自卫队仍然保持着力争卓越的传统。
如果黄海海战再次发生，日本海军要如何对抗中国军队呢？首先要承认，这是一个不太可能发生的场景。除非北京打算在外交上孤立东京（聪明的有限战的实施者会力图这么做），抑或东京采取愚蠢的外交政策将自己孤立起来，否则中日间爆发直接战争的可能性非常小。如若不然，冲突将可能诱使美国作为"好战者"站在日本这一边。战争是一场政治行为，美国军事理论家阿尔弗雷德•塞耶•马汉（Alfred Thayer Mahan）就曾说过，"政治家指挥军队"。但是，如果我们扣除政治的因素，单纯严格地从军事角度来观望中日海战的前景，将会是怎样的结果呢？
如果单从原始数值上来看，中日间根本不存在什么竞争。日本海上自卫队拥有48艘"主要的水上战舰"，用于攻击敌军的战队。日本海上自卫队声称，水上战舰包括"直升机驱逐舰"、装配有最先进的宙斯盾作战系统的导弹驱逐舰、雷达阵、计算机系统和美国前线战舰配备的高炮火力控制系统，以及各式各样的小型驱逐舰、护卫舰和轻巡洋舰。同时，一个中队的16艘柴电动力潜艇也增强了水平舰队的作战能力。
相对之下，中国人民解放军拥有73艘主要水上战舰、84艘导弹巡逻艇和63艘潜艇。中国海军战舰的造价更是令日本望尘莫及。中国海军战舰在钢材的绝对重量上就比日本的重得多。
但是，原始数值也会给人误导。原因有三：首先，军事家爱德华·鲁特瓦克（Edward Luttwak）就曾指出，除非在作战时得到实际运用，否则武器就像是"黑盒子"一样。没有人肯定地知道这些武器是否可以像所宣称的那样发挥作用。军事技术价值真正的检测者是战争，而不是技术规范。要精准地预测出战舰、飞机和导弹是否会在战时的警长和混乱中的表现是不可能的。鲁特瓦克还补充说，当这是一个开放的社会对抗一个封闭的社会时，这种意外表现就更有可能出现。开放的社会有一种习惯，公开地讨论军事上的失败，而封闭的社会更愿意让失利秘而不宣。
鲁特瓦克指的是美苏间的海军竞赛，不过这也适用用现在中日间的军事竞争。当年，苏联的海军在表面上看起来很威风。但是，在冷战期间，从粗心的船舶操作到生锈的船体外壳，苏联战舰在公海上的表面显示出了明显衰落的征兆。中国军队可能也有所隐藏。日本海上自卫队的素质以及日本海员的能力，可能将部份或完全抵消中国军队在人数上的优势。
第二，在战争中存在着人的变量。美国前总统罗斯福在其著作《1812年战争中的海战》（The Naval War of 1812）中将美国海军同英国皇家海军在单船决斗上的胜利归功于船舶设计和建造的高品质以及卓越的战斗能力。换句话说，就是材料和人的因素。而后者则靠航海和射击技术，以及将自己与其它海军区别开来的无数先进特征来衡量。这些特征不是靠水手坐在港口抛光武器就能得到来，而是要靠实际的出海经验累积而成。一直以来，日本海上自卫队在亚洲海域持续高密度地进行单独或联合海上军事活动。而中国军队的活动却相对迟缓。所以，日本拥有人员方面的优势。中国从2009年开始的亚丁湾抗击海盗的行动可能可以算是例外，但中国舰队只进行了短暂的护航或演习，船员们只有很少的时间以实战方式组合、学习专业技能或形成良好的习惯。日本拥有人的优势。
第三，仅从战舰数量上来看问题是具有误导性的。在东北亚地区，不可能存在单纯地战舰交战。中日两国在地理位置上非常接近。它们的陆地，包括离岛，本身就是永不会沉没的航空母舰和导弹发射平台。通过适当的武装和强化，陆地基地就可以成为强大的海上力量的工具。所以，我们应将两国地面火力的因素纳入考量范围。
日本所在的第一岛链包裹着亚洲的海岸线，形成了黄海和东海的东部边界。在对马海峡（这把日本和韩国分隔开）和台湾之间，超过500英里的中国海岸线内都没有任何岛屿。包括钓鱼岛(专题|论坛)/尖阁诸岛在内的大多数岛屿都要近得多。在这些狭窄的水域中，任何可能的战场都在岸上火力范围之内。中日两国军队都可以使用战术飞机将自己的作战半径扩大到穿过黄海和东海，进入西太平洋中。双方都拥有海岸发射的反舰巡航导弹，增强自己的综合打击能力。
但是，这其中也有一些不对称性存在。解放军的常规弹道导弹可以在整个亚洲地区打击任何一个地面基地，可以在日本战舰离港或战机起飞之前就令日本的设备处于危险状态之中。中国的二炮也被报道拥有反舰弹道导弹，足以在陆地上打击海上的移动船只。由于射击范围超过900英里，反舰弹道导弹可以打击中国海域内的任何目标，以及整个日本岛的港口，甚至更远。
从日本的立场看，钓鱼岛(专题|论坛)是最难"保卫的领土"。钓鱼岛位于琉球岛链的西南角，相对冲绳或日本本岛来说更靠近台湾。从远距离基地"保卫"钓鱼岛将会非常困难。但是，如果日本在前沿部署88型反舰艇巡航导弹（这是可移动、易携带的反舰武器），向周边小岛和琉球岛链派遣导弹部队，其地面部队就可以产生重叠火力，将附近海域转换成中国航线的禁区。这些力量一旦部署将很难被驱逐，即使中国决定出动火箭和战斗机。
任何将海陆空部队打造成海战最有力武器的一方将拥有获胜的好机会。如果日本政府和军方领导人可以创造性地进行思考、装配正确的武器、尽最大努力地在空间上排兵遣将，那么日本就将获得这个胜利的机会。毕竟，日本不需要打败中国军队就可以在海上赢得一次展现实力的机会，因为日本已经拥有了争议岛屿的实际控制权，它只需拒绝中国的插手即可。如果东北亚的海洋成为无人区但日本的军事力量可以保持的话，那么政治上的胜利就属于东京。
日本还有一大优势，就是可以将兵力集中于国内。而中国人民解放军海军不得不在长长的海岸线上分散成三大舰队。中国的指挥官们面临着这样一个难题：如果他们在与日本对抗时集中大量火力的话，那么其他利益攸关的地区就顾不上了。比如说，对于北京来说，在东北部海域发生冲突时，南海就可能变成无人值守。
最后，中国的领导人必须要考虑海战会在多大的程度上打击他们的海上投射能力。中国的经济和外交未来再很大程度上要依靠强大的海军。2006年12月，胡锦涛主席命令解放军军官建设"强大的人民海军"来防卫中国的海上生命线——尤其是连接印度洋的石油出口国和中国用户之间的航线——"随时随地"地保卫。这需要很多船。如果在中日冲突中失去了不少战舰的话，即使获胜，北京也会认为是在一个下午就从国际大国的巅峰地位滑落了。
希望中国政府和军方的领导人可以考虑到所有这些。如果他们真的考虑了，以上所讨论的所谓"中日2012海战"将不会发生。
Lord Wellington depicted the allied triumph at Waterloo as "the nearest-run thing you ever saw in your life." Wellington's verdict would describe the likely outcome should Chinese and Japanese forces meet in battle over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, or elsewhere off the Northeast Asian seaboard. Such a fight appeared farfetched before 2010, when Japan's Coast Guard apprehended Chinese fishermen who rammed one of its vessels off the disputed islands, but it appears more likely now.After Japan detained and deported Chinese activists who landed on the disputed islands in mid-August, a hawkish Chinese major general, Luo Yuan, called on China to dispatch 100 boats to defend the Diaoyus. In an op-ed published Aug. 20, the nationalistic Chinese broadsheet Global Times warned, "Japan will pay a price for its actions ... and the result will be far worse than they anticipated."
This is more than mere posturing. In July, China's East Sea Fleet conducted an exercise simulating an amphibious assault on the islands. China's leaders are clearly thinking about the unthinkable. And with protesters taking to the streets to smash Japanese cars and attack sushi restaurants, their people may be behind them. So who would win the unlikely prospect of a clash of titans in the Pacific: China or Japan?
Despite Japan's latter-day image as a military pushover, a naval war would not be a rout for China. While the Japanese postwar "peace" constitution "forever renounces war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes," the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) has accumulated several pockets of material excellence, such as undersea warfare, since World War II. And Japanese mariners are renowned for their professionalism. If commanders manage their human, material, and geographic advantages artfully, Tokyo could make a maritime war with China a close-run thing -- and perhaps even prevail.
Past naval wars between the two rivals set the stage for today's island controversy. During the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895, a fleet engagement turned Asia's Sinocentric order upside down in an afternoon. The Imperial Japanese Navy, hurriedly cobbled together from imported hulls and components following Japan's Meiji Restoration, smashed China's Beiyang Fleet, a force widely considered superior in material terms. The September 1894 Battle of the Yalu River was won by the navy with superior seamanship, gunnery, and morale. While Japan is no longer a rising power, the JMSDF has preserved a culture of human excellence.
If a rerun of the Battle of the Yalu takes place, how would Japan's navy match up against China's? This is admittedly an improbable scenario. A straightforward China-on-Japan war is doubtful unless Beijing manages to isolate Tokyo diplomatically -- as wise practitioners of limited war attempt to do -- or Tokyo isolates itself through foolish diplomacy. Barring that, a conflict would probably ensnare the United States as an active combatant on the Japanese side. War is a political act -- "statesmanship directing arms," as naval historian Alfred Thayer Mahan puts it -- but let's discount politics for now and look at the prospects of war in strictly military terms, as a contest between Chinese and Japanese sea power.
In raw numerical terms, there is no contest. Japan's navy boasts 48 "major surface combatants," ships designed to attack enemy main fleets while taking a pounding themselves. For the JMSDF these include "helicopter destroyers," or light aircraft carriers; guided-missile destroyers equipped with the state-of-the-art Aegis combat system, a combination radar, computer, and fire-control system found in frontline U.S. Navy warships; and an assortment of lesser destroyers, frigates, and corvettes. A squadron of 16 diesel-electric submarines augments the surface fleet. Juxtapose this against the PLA Navy's 73 major surface combatants, 84 missile-firing patrol craft, and 63 submarines, and the bidding appears grim for Japan. China's navy is far superior in sheer weight of steel.
But raw numbers can be misleading, for three main reasons. First, as strategist Edward Luttwak has observed, weapons are like "black boxes" until actually used in combat: no one knows for sure whether they will perform as advertised. Battle, not technical specifications, is the true arbiter of military technology's value. Accurately forecasting how ships, planes, and missiles will perform amid the stresses and chaos of combat thus verges on impossible. This is especially true, adds Luttwak, when conflict pits an open society against a closed one. Open societies have a habit of debating their military failings in public,whereas closed societies tend to keep their deficiencies out of view. Luttwak was referring to the U.S.-Soviet naval competition, but it applies to Sino-Japanese competition as well. The Soviet Navy appeared imposing on paper. But Soviet warships on the high seas during the Cold War showed unmistakable symptoms of decay, from slipshod shiphandling to rusty hulls. The PLA Navy could be hiding something as well. The quality of the JMSDF's platforms, and its human capabilities, could partially or wholly offset the PLA's advantage of numbers.
Second, there's the human variable in warfare. In his classic account, The Naval War of 1812, Theodore Roosevelt explained the U.S. Navy's success in single-ship duels against Britain's Royal Navy as a product of quality ship design and construction and superior fighting prowess: in other words, of material and human factors. The latter is measured in seamanship, gunnery, and the myriad of traits that set one navy apart from others. Mariners hone these traits not by sitting in port and polishing their equipment but by going to sea. JMSDF flotillas ply Asian waters continually, operating solo or with other navies. The PLA Navy is inert by comparison. With the exception of a counter-piracy deployment to the Gulf of Aden that began in 2009, Chinese fleets emerge only for brief cruises or exercises, leaving crews little time to develop an operating rhythm, learn their profession, or build healthy habits. The human edge goes to Japan.
And three, it's misleading to reduce the problem solely to fleets. There will be no purely fleet-on-fleet engagement in Northeast Asia. Geography situated the two Asian titans close to each other: their landmasses, including outlying islands, are unsinkable aircraft carriers and missile firing platforms. Suitably armed and fortified, land-based sites constitute formidable implements of sea power. So we need to factor in both countries' land-based firepower.
Japan forms the northern arc of the first island chain that envelops the Asian coastline, forming the eastern frontier of the Yellow and East China seas. No island between the Tsushima Strait (which separates Japan from Korea) and Taiwan lies more than 500 miles off China's coast. Most, including the Senkakus/Diaoyus, are far closer. Within these cramped waters, any likely battleground would fall within range of shore-based firepower. Both militaries field tactical aircraft that boast the combat radius to strike throughout the Yellow and East China seas and into the Western Pacific. Both possess shore-fired anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs) and can add their hitting power to the mix.
There are some asymmetries, however.PLA conventional ballistic missiles can strike at land sites throughout Asia, putting Japanese assets at risk before they ever leave port or take to the sky. And China's Second Artillery Corps, or missile force, has reportedly fielded anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs) able to strike at moving ships at sea from the mainland. With a range estimated at more than 900 miles, the ASBM could strike anywhere in the China seas, at seaports throughout the Japanese islands, and far beyond.
Consider the Senkakus, the hardest assets to defendfrom the Japanese standpoint. They lie near the southwestern tip of the Ryukyu chain, closer to Taiwan than to Okinawa or Japan's major islands. Defending them from distant bases would be difficult. But if Japan forward-deployed Type 88 ASCMs -- mobile, easily transportable anti-ship weapons -- and missile crews to the islets and to neighboring islands in the Ryukyu chain, its ground troops could generate overlapping fields of fire that would convert nearby seas into no-go zones for Chinese shipping. Once dug in, they would be tough to dislodge, even for determined Chinese rocketeers and airmen.
Whoever forges sea, land, and air forces into the sharpest weapon of sea combat stands a good chance of prevailing. That could be Japan if its political and military leaders think creatively, procure the right hardware, and arrange it on the map for maximum effect. After all, Japan doesn't need to defeat China's military in order to win a showdown at sea, because it already holds the contested real estate; all it needs to do is deny China access. If Northeast Asian seas became a no-man's land but Japanese forces hung on, the political victory would be Tokyo's.
Japan also enjoys the luxury of concentrating its forces at home, whereas the PLA Navy is dispersed into three fleets spread along China's lengthy coastline. Chinese commanders face a dilemma: If they concentrate forces to amass numerical superiority during hostilities with Japan, they risk leaving other interests uncovered. It would hazardous for Beijing to leave, say, the South China Sea unguarded during a conflict in the northeast.
And finally, Chinese leaders would be forced to consider how far a marine war would set back their sea-power project. China has staked its economic and diplomatic future in large part on a powerful oceangoing navy. In December 2006, President Hu Jintao ordered PLA commanders to construct "a powerful people's navy" that could defend the nation's maritime lifelines -- in particular sea lanes that connect Indian Ocean energy exporters with users in China -- "at any time." That takes lots of ships. If it lost much of the fleet in a Sino-Japanese clash -- even in a winning effort -- Beijing could see its momentum toward world-power status reversed in an afternoon.
Here's hoping China's political and military leaders understand all this. If so, the Great Sino-Japanese Naval War of 2012 won't be happening outside these pages.
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发表于 2012-9-12 09:59:58
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